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Strict Liability Versus Negligence: An Economic
Analysis of the Law of Libel
At common law, the publisher of a defamatory statement
was held strictly liable for any injury inflicted upon the person
defamed. The plaintiff in a libel action was not required to prove
negligence. The defendant could defend only by proving that the
defamatory statement was true or that it came within one of the
recognized privileges.
In New York Times Co. v. S ~ l l i v a n the
, ~ Supreme Court
radically altered the common-law rule by holding that strict liability for libel was unconstitutional when the person defamed
was a public official. The Court criticized the strict liability rule
because "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true
and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
SO."'
Thus, in order to avoid unduly suppressing the publication
of defamatory statements, the Court required a defamed public
official to prove "actual malice" in order to recover damages.'
The New York Times rule was extended to dl public figures
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts6 and its companion case, Associated Press v. W ~ l k e rHowever,
.~
in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,' which was decided ten years after New York Times, the
Court drew a distinction between public figures and private
figures and held that a defamed private figure need not prove
actual malice in order to recover. Strict liability was, however,
still prohibited. Thus, short of imposing strict liability, the
states were left free to "define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liabilit~."~
1. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS
776-801 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 279.
4. Id. at 279-80. "Actual malice" was defined as "knowledge that [the statement]
was false or . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
5. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
6. Id. (consolidated opinion).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. Id. at 347. The Court gave two reasons for its decision to treat public figures

.
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The Gertz decision emphasized that a proper balance must
be struck between freedom of speech and "the state interest in
compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals."@
The Court noted that while the actual malice standard of New
York Times
administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement
to media self-censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander, . . . it exacts a correspondingly
high price from the victims of the defamatory falsehood.
Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of
the New York Times test.1°

Gertz thus reflects the Court's efforts to formulate a liability rule that will not induce an excessive amount of self-censorship while at the same time not encouraging an excessive
amount of defamation. The Court concluded that a negligence
rule best accommodates these competing interests, at least when
private persons are defamed.
At a time when many areas of the law are characterized by a
shift from negligence toward strict liability, a shift in the opposite direction is a rather curious phenomenon. The Supreme
Court is apparently convinced that a negligence rule is more
likely than a strict liability rule to induce publishers to publish
the "efficient" level of defamation." This Comment will provide
an economic analysis and comparison of strict liability and negligence in the peculiar context of libel and will inquire into the
practical effect of a constitutional preference for negligence over
strict liability.
differently than private figures. First, public figures have better access to the media and
can more easily correct erroneous statements. Secondly, public figures are less deserving
of recovery because they assume the risk of defamation by injecting themselves into public life. Id. at 344-45.
9. Id. at 343.
10. Id. at 342.

11. If the benefit from reducing the amount of false defamation exceeds the cost of
doing so, it is efficient to reduce the amount of false defamation. When the amount of
false defamation can be reduced no further except by excessively inhibiting the publication of true defamation, then it is not efficient to further reduce the amount of false
defamation.
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A. The Problem of Property Rights
It is very difficult to acquire and enforce property rights in
information. Although patent and copyright laws create enforceable rights in some kinds of information, rights in other kinds of
information are not so well protected. News reporters, for example, cannot effectively enforce property rights in the information
they gather.12 The first reporter to learn of or report the occurrence of a certain event cannot preclude others from also reporting it as soon as they acquire the information. The inability of
the news reporter to preclude consumers from purchasing an
item of information from a competitor means that no reporter
can appropriate the entire social benefit of that information.
Thus, the social benefit of the information exceeds its private
benefit?
Defamatory statements are merely a special kind of information. Unlike other kinds of information, however, defamation
can cause great injury. While true defamatory statements convey
valuable information to those who interact with the person defamed, false defamatory statements injure the person defamed
as well as those who rely upon the erroneous information."
Unfortunately, it is often very costly to ascertain truth. A
publisher is not always certain whether a defamatory statement
is true or false. In view of this uncertainty, there is always some
risk that it is false. Thus, false defamatory statements are properly viewed as an unavoidable cost of publishing true defamatory statements. It is therefore the goal of the law of libel to
create a liability rule that will provide publishers with the incentive to publish the "efficient," or cost-justified, amount of libel.
Strict liability and negligence have traditionally been the competing alternatives between which the courts must choose.
12. See R. POSNER,ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OF LAW544 (2d ed. 1977).
13. Social benefit is the aggregate benefit of the information to society. Private benefit is the value that a particular publisher derives from publication.
14. This analysis assumes that true defamation as discerned by judges and juries is
desirable while false defamation is not, even though true defamation may be more damaging to the defamed person because it is more likely to be believed. This also appears to
be the implicit assumption of the Supreme Court in Gertz. Thus, no attempt is made to
consider the issue whether truth should be determined by courts or by the market. See
P. POSNER,supra note 12, at 544.
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B. Incentives Created by Alternative Rules
1. Strict liability
If a publisher is strictly liable for the publication of a
libelous statement, the publisher must either prove the defamatory statement to be true or pay damages to the person defamed." If the cost of proving the truth of a statement exceeds
the damages caused by the statement, the publisher will choose
to pay damages. If, however, the cost of damages exceeds the
cost of proving the truth of the statement, the publisher will
elect to defend himself by proving the truth. Therefore, the publisher who is strictly liable for libel will publish a defamatory
statement only if the private benefit of publishing the statement
exceeds the lower of the cost of proving truth or the cost of paying damages.
2. Negligence

Under a negligence rule, a publisher can avoid both the cost
of proving truth and the cost of paying damages as long as publication is not negligent. Because the goal of a negligence rule is
to provide an incentive for the publisher to behave efficiently,
efficiency should be the standard of care by which a publisher's
conduct is measured. Thus, a publisher should be found negligent if, and only if, the expected cost to society of avoiding a
libel is less than the expected damages to society resulting from
its publication.16
Assuming that the cost of proving the truth of a defamatory
statement exceeds the damages caused by the statement,17 the
only way to avoid libel is not to publish the statement. The cost
of not publishing a true defamatory statement is the value the
statement would have had to society had it been published.
Since, by hypothesis, it is not feasible to determine whether the
statement is in fact true, the expected cost of avoiding libel is
15. This assumes that none of the recognized privileges are available as affirmative
defenses.
16. An analogous standard of care was articulated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Carroll Towing co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Posner, A
Theory Of Negligence, 1 J . LEGALSTUD.29 (1972).
17. Because the cost of proving truth is not affected by the liability rule, it will be
assumed that the cost of proving truth always exceeds the cost of paying damages.
Therefore, publishers are assumed to be concerned only with the cost of damages since it
is even more costly to avoid damages by proving truth.
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the value to society of the statement if it were true discounted
by the probability that it is true. The expected damages caused
by a defamatory statement are measured by the expected cost to
society of a false statement discounted by the probability that
the statement is false.
Under a negligence rule, a publisher will incur the cost of
damages for libel only if the expected social cost of publication
exceeds the expected social value. The publisher is thereby encouraged to incorporate social costs and benefits into his own
private cost benefit analysis in determining what should be published. Thus, defamation should be neither more nor less likely
to be underproduced than any other kind of information.18

C. Comparison of Strict Liability with Negligence
Professor Posner has argued that strict liability and negligence are both efficient when efficiency requires the producer of
an injury-causing good to take some action to reduce the amount
of the injury? This argument assumes, however, that social benefit equals private benefit. If the producer of the good is strictly
liable for all injuries caused by the good, but does not appropriate the entire social benefit of the good, it is quite possible that
private cost will exceed private benefit even though social benefits exceed social costs. In that event, the good will not be produced even though production would be efficient:O This is precisely the problem with defamation which the negligence rule is
intended to rectify.
The following table illustrates the publication decisions
that obtain under strict liability and negligence rules in fifteen
possible combinations of expected costs and benefits. It is not
intended to exhaust all the possibilities, but does illustrate the
more interesting ones. Categories 1-3 illustrate cases where the
social benefit of publication exceeds the private benefit and the
18. This does not mean that a negligence rule would result in the publication of the
efficient amount of defamation. It would, however, prevent the threat of liability from
aggravating the problem of inadequately defined property rights in information.
19. See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD.205 (1973).
20. It is quite possible that the social cost of false defamation exceeds its cost to the
person defamed. Thus it is possible that social cost will exceed social benefit but that
private benefit will exceed private cost. If this occurs the defamation will be published
even though it is inefficient to do so. This problem might be remedied by givipg a cause
of action to all those harmed rather than restricting the cause of action to the person
defamed. It is not, however, affected by the choice of strict liability or negligence, and
will not, therefore, be further discussed.
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social cost equals the private cost. Categories 4-6 illustrate cases
where social benefit equals private benefit and social cost equals
private cost. Categories 7-9 illustrate cases where social benefit
equals private benefit and social cost exceeds private cost. Categories 10-15 illustrate cases where social benefit exceeds private
benefit and social cost exceeds private cost.
Bp

Cp

Bs

Cs

Pt

Strict Liability
Outcome

1

$10

$1000

$1000

$1000

.5

No Publication Publication*

Indifferent

Bs > Bp

2

$10

$1000

$2000

$1000

.5

No Publication Publication

Publication

Cp

3

$10

$2000

$1000

$2000

.5

No Publication

No Publication

No Publication

4

$1000

$2000

$1000

$2000

.5

No Publication

No Publication

No Publication

Cs

=

Negligence
Outcome

Efficient
Outcome

BS

=

Bp

5

$1000

$1000

$1000

$1000

.5

Indifferent

Publication*

Indifferent

Cs

=

Cp

6

$2000

$1000

$2000

$1000

.5

Publication

Publication

Publication

7

$1000

$100

$1000

$1000

.5

Publication

Publication

Indifferent

Bp

8

$2000

$100

$2000

$1000

.5

Publication

Publication

Publication

Cs > Cp

9

$1000

$100

$1000

$2000

.5

Publication

Publication

No Publication

10

$10

$50

$1000

$1000

.5

No Publication Publication*

Indifferent

11

$10

$50

$2000

$1000

.5

No Publication Publication

Publication

Bs > Bp

12

$10

$50

$1000

$2000

.5

No Publication No Publication

No Publication

Cs > Cp

13

$50

$10

$1000

$1000

.5

Publication

Publication

Indifferent

14

$50

$10

$2000

$1000

.5

Publication

Publication

Publication

15

$50

$10

$1000

$2000

.5

Publication

Publication*

No Publication

Bs

Bp
Cp
Bs
Cs
Pt

=

=
=

=
=
=

Private benefit (value of publication to publisher)
Private cost (cost of publication to publisher if held liable)
Social benefit (benefit of publication to society)
Social cost (cost of publication to society)
Probability that statement is true

* This result is reached because the plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence.

An examination of the table reveals that neither negligence
nor strict liability always leads to the efficient outcome. Whenever the value of publication to the publisher exceeds the damages to the plaintiff, the defamatory statement will be published
regardless of the liability rule chosen. Since strict liability and
negligence lead to identical results in these cases, cases 6-9 and
13-15 are irrelevant in deciding which rule is preferable.
Having eliminated all cases in which the value to the pub-
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lisher exceeds the damages to the plaintiff, the only remaining
cases are those in which a strict liability rule leads to no publication. Because a negligence rule will also result in no publication
where (Pt)(B,) is less than (1-Pt)(Cs),cases 3, 4, and 12 are not
instructive and can also be ignored. This leaves only cases 1, 2,
5, 10, and 11 as relevant.
The differences between strict liability and negligence obtained in 1, 5, and 10 are attributable to the law's requirement
that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving negligence. Thus,
when negligence is not proven, the plaintiff loses. Cases (Pt)(Bs)
= (1-Pt)(Cs)are likely to be very rare. Furthermore, even when
they do occur, there is no basis for preferring one liability rule
over the other.
In cases 2 and 11, negligence is preferred to strict liability
because the results obtained with the negligence rule correspond
to the efficient result, whereas the results obtained under strict
liability are inefficient. One can thus extract from these cases a
general rule favoring negligence if, and only if, (Pt)(Bs) is greater
than (1-Pt)(Cs)and B is less than C,.
Without the benett of empirical evidence, it is impossible to
know whether these conditions occur often enough for a negligence rule to be significantly more efficient than strict liability.
Nevertheless, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that these
conditions exist in a significant number of cases and probably in
most cases. Thus, a perfectly applied negligence rule is probably
significantly more efficient than strict liability.

D. Practical Problems
Under either strict liability or negligence, a publisher will
publish a defamatory statement only if the expected benefit exceeds the expected cost. Negligence is preferred to strict liability
whenever (Pt)(Bs) (1-Pt)(Cs) and B, < C, only because it permits the publisher to assume that damages are zero when it is
economically efficient to do so. However, the publisher can assume that damages are zero only when the probability of being
found negligent is also zero. Whenever there is a positive
probability of being held liable, the publisher will expect to pay
damages in an amount equal to the total damages discounted by
the probability of being held liable and modify his publication
decision accordingly.
Information regarding social costs and benefits of a defamatory statement is very costly for juries and publishers to obtain.
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For example, how does one estimate the value to society of
~ ~equally diffiknowing that an individual is a c o m m ~ n i s t ?An
cult problem is estimating the probability that a given statement
is true.22Given these uncertainties, there will almost certainly be
a positive probability that the publisher of a defamatory statement will be held liable despite his best efforts to act non-negligently. In practice, therefore, the theoretical advantages of a
negligence rule are mitigated by the uncertainty that results
from imperfect information.
This problem is further complicated by the inability of most
publishers to appropriate the entire social benefit of a publication. The injury to a defamed person's reputation often far exceeds the benefit the publisher derives from publication. This
fact, coupled with the positive probability that a publisher will
be held liable, can result in no publication even when publication would be efficient. Assume, for example, that a publisher
expects to be held liable for libel twenty percent of the time despite his best efforts to act non-negligently. Assume further that
the expected private benefit of publication is $1,000, but that
the damages caused to the defamed person equal $10,000. Because the expected private benefit of publication is $1,000, while
the expected cost is $2,000 (.20 x $10,000), the publisher would
not publish the statement no matter how great the social benefit
of publication might be. Assuming a twenty percent chance of
liability, a defamatory statement will be published only if the
damages caused the defamed person are less than five times the
private benefit of publication. Even a very small probability that
a publisher will be held liable will result in no publication if the
disparity between private benefit and private cost is very large."
21. The defamatory publication that gave rise to the litigation in Gertz included a
statement that Mr. Gertz was a Communist. See Gertz, 418 U.S.a t 326.
22. The preponderance of the evidence test, generally applied in civil cases, requires
a jury to determine whether the probability that certain allegations are true is greater or
less than .5. However, the negligence rule described above requires a jury to be precise in
estimating the probability that a statement is true. Thus, for example, rather than determine whether that probability is greater or less than .5, the jury must determine whether
it is .2. .4, .7, or .9. It seems unreasonable to assume that juries can adequately perform
this task.
23. If the probability that a publisher will have to pay damages is greater than the
ratio of private benefit to damages caused the plaintiff, then the publisher will not publish the defamatory statement.
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The inefficiency resulting from the disparity between the
private benefit and the social benefit of publishing defamatory
statements is aggravated by a strict liability rule for libel. A negligence rule would in theory induce publishers to be more efficient by immunizing them from liability when the social benefit
of publication exceeds its social cost. However, since neither juries nor publishers can always accurately determine social costs
and benefits, there will always be a positive probability that a
publisher will be held liable despite his best efforts to act nonnegligently. If the probability of being held liable multiplied by
the expected damages caused to the defamed person exceeds the
private benefit of publication, then the publisher will not publish even though publication would be efficient. Thus, it is quite
possible that a negligence rule will induce the same behavior as
strict liability. Empirical studies are the only means of determining whether the negligence rule has had an important impact
on the publication decisions of publishers.
Gary L. Lee

